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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
E\T . .:\. EISNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
CorporaJtion, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LEO BONNERU, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Respondent. / 
Case No. 
7675 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SALT LAKE CITY 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because we consider Plaintiff's Statement of Facts 
altogether too sketchy to give the Court a basis for 
passing upon the issues involved in this appeal, we deem 
it necessary to make our own Statement of Facts. 
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As shown by Exhibit 3, and the oral testimony, the 
sidewalk on the south side of 3rd South in Salt Lake 
City, running West from West Temple, consists of two 
sec;tions or tiers of concrete blocks extending from the 
curb south a total of 16 feet, each section being 8 feet 
wide. Just west of 125 West 3rd South, where the Fitwell 
Artificial Limb Company is located, one block of the 
cement in the outer section next to the curb had been 
removed, leaving a bare space 6 feet wide east and west, 
and 8 feet long north and south, referred to in the evi-
dence as the "gravelly" area or open space. In the fall 
of 1948 the City installed a water meter box at the south-
west corner of this open space, and Third-Party Defend-
ant LEO BONNERU installed a sewer line across this 
space for the building of the Fitwell Artificial Limb 
Company. There is no evidence as to who removed the 
cement block. But !the cement block was not replaced 
and the open space still remained uncovered at the time 
of Plaintiff's injury which occurred November 26, 1949. 
The surface in this open space had settled so that for 
nearly its entire 6 foot width east and west and extend-
ing several feet north from the south section of the con-
crete walk, there was a depression (R. 73). The general 
condition is shown by the photographs, Exhibits "E" 
and "F", and the penciled outline on Exhibit "3". 
Plaintiff lived at 143 West 3rd South, just a short 
distance west of this open space. For over a year prior 
to the accidenlt she had passed this open space two or 
three times a day, and was thoroughly familiar with it. 
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She realized it 'vas dangerous, and had said to herself 
that so1nebody is going to be hurt there sometime (R. 42, 
43). She had no difficulty in seeing the hole as she 
passed by. It 'vas perfe0tly visible to any one who might 
look at it (R. 54). The accident happened about 10 :30 
A.M. while she was returning to her home from Auerbach's 
store. The day "~as bright and sunshiny. There was no 
snow, and the 'Yalk was dry. As she walked along, there 
was no-one in front of her going v.rest. No-one obstructed 
the hole or depression (R. 44). The view around the 
place where the hole was "\vas entirely unobstructed (R. 
68). If she _had looked, there was nothing to prevent 
her from seeing the hole as she walked west. As she 
approached the hole, she was conscious she was in the 
vicinity of it, and she knew she was in the vicinity of the 
hole in the sidewalk (R. 44). As she was walking west, 
she was walking close to the nol'lth edge of the south 
section of concrete blocks so that when she came to the 
area where the cement was gone, where the hole was, she 
was right close to the edge of the hole (R. 45). She did 
not look at the hole at all before she stepped in1to it 
(R. 47). When she got within a dozen feet of the hole, 
she did not see it (R. 48). She did not look when she 
stepped to the side, to the right, when she stepped off the 
cemenJt into the hole with her right foot. 
At one place in her testimony she testified that she 
had gone to a point indicated by a cross on Exhibit "3" 
when she first saw some children approaching (R. 47). 
This point is about 18 inches west of the east edge of 
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the open space. At another place she rtestified she was 
at the southeast corner of the open space, shown by the 
letter "Z" on Exhibit "3", when she first saw the chil-
dren (R. 48). In either event, she was right at or oppo-
site ~the hole before she saw the children, so that up to 
that point there had been nothing to distract her atten-
tion away from the· sidewalk before her. At another place 
she testified she moved from point "Z" on Exhibit "3", 
the southeast corner of the open space, to where the hole 
was and into which she stepped before any person coming 
from the west arrived at that point. She saw none of the 
children get to her. They were just coming toward her. 
When she first saw the children they were about 4 feet 
west of her ( R. 68, 69). 
When she saw the children approaching she stepped 
off to the right (R. 47). None of them had reached her 
or run into her or touched .her. They were 3 or 4 feet 
west of her when she first saw them (R. 49). l!t was 
for the first part of the group that she stepped aside. 
The children were strung out and not coming abreast 
(R. 52). But none of the children had gotten up to the 
place where she fell up to the time that she fell (R. 67). 
She testified there were 50 to 60 children in the crowd 
(R. 29). In her deposition she stated there were 100 
(R. 68). 
Plaintiff located the hole in which she stepped in 
several different places. She made a cross on Exhibit 
"E" as lthe place where she stepped off. This mark is not 
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in any part of the depression as the n1ark on the exhibit 
"ill disclose ( R. :28). She also Inade a cross on Exhibit 
~· F~~ to indicate the hole into which she stepped. This 
indicates the hole "'"a8 \Yesterly from the east edge of the 
open space, probably about 18 inches. This coincides 
-writh the cross she placed on Exhibit "3" as being the 
place she stepped into the hole (R. 29). However, in her 
deposition taken April 1, 1950, she couldn't remember 
the place where she fell (R. 50). In her claim filed with 
the City, she stated under oath that the hole was about 
1 foot to the east of the water meter. So, if the hole was 
1 foot east of the water meter, it wouldn't be where she 
marked it on Exhibit "E" (R. 58). She later testified 
that her memory was clearer when she signed the claim 
December 12, 1948, when she stated the hoJe was about 
1 foot east of the water meter (R. 66). At one place she 
testified, finally, that the hole was over by the water 
meter, marked "D" on Exhibit "F" (R. 64). 
If Plaintiff stepped off into. the depression at the 
point indicated by her cross on Exhibit "F" and Exhibit 
"3", she had already gone approximately 18 inches of 
the length of the depression. If she stepped off a foot 
east of the water meter, she had gone past about 3lf2 
feet of the length of the depression before she fell. In 
either event, the depression was there, plainly visible 
before her, immediately adjacent to where she was walk-
ing. There was noithing to distract her attention or pre-
ve·nt her from seeing the depression as she approached 
and reached it and proceeded to pass along it. She had 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
already reached it before she saw the children. She knew 
the hole was there; she was conscious that she was in its 
vicinity and she knew it was dangerous. No reason is 
given for her stepping aside to the right. There is no 
evidence the children were occupying the entire walk or 
that they in any manner threatened to come in contact 
with her. All she says is that "a lot of kids came along 
and they were kind of coming toward me, and I stepped 
off a little bit off the walk, and that is when I fell." (R. 
25). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
A PERSON IS HELD TO HAVE SEEN THAT WHICH 
IS PLAINLY VISIBLE AND OPEN BEFORE HIM. 
POINT II. 
IT IS THE DUTY OF A PERSON USING A SIDEWALK, 
WHERE HE KNOWS A DEFECT EXISTS, TO BE ON THE 
LOOKOUT FOR IT. 
POINT III. 
A PERSON, WHO, IN BROAD DAYLIGHT, STEPS INTO 
AN OPEN, PLAINLY VISIBLE DEFECT IN THE SIDE-
WALK, WITH WHICH HE IS FAMILIAR, IS GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT IV. 
TO EXCUSE FAILURE TO SEE AN OPEN, PLAINLY 
VISIBLE KNOWN DEFECT, THE PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW 
SOME COMPELLING REASON OUTSIDE HERSELF THAT 
WOULD JUSTIFY HER FAILURE TO SEE THE DEFECT 
IN ORDER TO FREE. HER FROM CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE. 
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A PERSON IS HELD TO HAVE SEEN THAT WHICH 
IS PLAINLY VISIBLE AND OPEN BEFORE HIM. 
The evidence is undisputed that the defect, of which 
Plaintiff complains, was an open space six feet wide and 
eight feet long. The accident occurred in broad daylight 
on a sunshin-y-, clear day. The Plaintiff herself testified 
that she had no difficulty in seeing this defect as she 
passed by. It was perfectly visible to anyone who might 
look at it. Her view of the defect· was entirely unob-
structed; there was nothing to prevent her from see·ing 
it as she walked west. She was walking along a course 
where this defect was directly in front of her. No-one 
had distracted her attention up to the time she had 
arrived at the defect or was opposite the same!. It was 
of such a size and nature that it was plainly visible. 
Even a casual glance would have disclosed its presence. 
It seems impossible :that a person could have approached 
a depression as open and obvious as this without having 
seen it as she approached it, if she had paid any atte,ntion 
whatsoever to the sidewalk in front of her. We submit 
that Plaintiff cannot now be heard to say that she did 
not see that which was so plainly visible and obvious 
before her. In support of this proposition, we cite the 
following authorities.: 
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Rogers v. Max A.gen, Inc., 340 Pa. 328, 16 A. 2d, 
529. Here Plaintiff tripped over a base or shoe by means 
of which a bannister was anchored to the floor. The testi-
mony is as follows: 
"Q. After you fell you saw that base protruding 
out. 
A. The base was there and I saw it after they 
picked me up because I wanted to see what 
I fell on." 
"Q. Do I understand you to say you didn't see 
it before you fell~ 
A. Yes, sir, I didn't see it before I fell." 
"Q. You didn't look, did you Mrs. Rogers~ 
A. No." 
"Q. That portion of the bannister railing at the 
base on which you put your foot was plainly 
visible was it not~ You could see it~ It was 
plainly visible to the eye of anybody, includ-
ing yourself~ 
A. S·ure, I could see it." 
"Q. But you didn't look for it or at it or at that 
portion of the floor until after you had fallen~ 
A. No sir." 
"Q. That is correct~ 
A. That is right." 
The Court goes on to say : 
"Disclosing as it does thoughtless inattention 
to her surroundings and a complete failure to be 
duly observant of where she was stepping, this 
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testllnony leaYes no roo:rn for speculation as to the 
sole cause of appellant's injuries. It brings the 
case within the rule that 'vhere one is injured as 
a result of a failure on his part to observe and 
avoid an obvious condition which ordinary care 
for his own safety 'vould have disclosed, he will 
not be heard to complain." 
Jl!ulford v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, 
310 Pa. 5:21, 165 A. 837. Plaintiff alighted from a street-
car and proceeded a couple of steps from the car when 
she stepped into a hole or depression and fell, breaking 
her leg. Judgment of non-suit was entered. The Court 
says: 
"On the record before us, the court below 
could not properly have done otherwise than hold 
that l\frs. Mulford was, as a matter of law, guilty 
of contributory negligence. The accident occurred 
about noon on a bright, clear day.. The depression 
into which she stepped was six or eight inches 
deep, and about the size of a manhole cover. It 
was plainly visible·. If she had looked, she could 
not have helped seeing the danger, and it is well 
settled that one who steps into a defect in a pave-
ment which he could have seen and avoided, had 
he looked, cannot recover." 
Allshouse v. Borough Wilkinsburg, 343 Pa. 323, 22 
A. 2d 756. The Court says : 
"On a bright, clear day, about one-thirty in the 
afternoon, the Plaintiff tripped over the edge of 
a section of concrete sidewalk on North Avenue, 
Wilkinsburg, which was raised approximately two 
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and one-half inches above the section adjoining it. 
There was nothing to conceal the irregularity, 
but the Plaintiff testified that he· did not see it 
because the two sections of sidewalk were of the 
same color and because he was hurrying toward 
Pitt Street which he intended to cross and was 
part of the time engaged in making observation 
of traffic conditions along that Street. 
"Under the evidence presented we think the 
trial judge was required to enter a compulsory 
non-suit. To state the circumstances of the case 
is to convict the Plaintiff of contributory negli-
gence. He was bound to see what was plainly 
before him and similarity of color of the sections 
of the sidewalk and observation of traffic condi-
tions in a highway which he was approaching 
could not excuse, him." 
City of South Norfolk v. Dahl, 47 S.E. 2d 405, 187 
Va. 495. The Court says: 
"According to her own testimony, the plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. She testified that she stepped in a 
hole in the sidewalk which was about 2 feet in 
diameter, 2lf2 inches deep, and that in it the con-
crete had broken in pieces. This occurred in the 
daytime when it was not raining, and there was 
no obstruction to he~t vision. The hoJe was in her 
plain view but she stated that she did not see 
it until after she fell- that then she did see it 
for the first time.. She gives no excuse for not hav-
ing seen the hole before she stepped into it. No 
conclusion can be drawn from her testimony other 
than that she walked blindly into the hole which 
she was bound to have seen if she had looked. 
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There is no conflict in the evidence on this point 
and no roon1 for the deduction of conflicting infer-
ences. The hole was open and obvious to anyone 
'valking on the sidewalk in the exercise of ordin-
ary care. This case is controtled by Staunton v. 
Kerr, 160 \T a. 420, 168 S.E. 326." 
Rohmann v. City of Richmond Heights, 135 S.W. 
2d 378, the Court says: 
"No one may he excused from seeing that 
which is in plain view and which he could readily 
see by the exercise of due care. 
"He is not only required to look, but to look 
in such an observant manne·r as to enable him 
to see the conditions which a person in the exer-
cise of due care and caution for his own safety 
and the safety of others would have seen under 
like or similar circumstances, and it is as much 
negligence to fail to see that which can be observed 
by due care as it is negligence not to look at all. 
Not to see what is plainly visible where there is 
a duty to look constitutes negligence. 
"This condition of the backfill was in plain 
view. It was broad daylight at the time of the 
accident * * * Plaintiff stresses his own testimony 
to the effect that he could not see the condition 
of the backfill, but saying he could not see what 
was in plain view, in broad daylight, is without 
probative force. Plaintiff's own testimony shows 
him guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law." 
Seiser v. Redfield, 211 Iowa 1035, 232 N.W. 129. 
In this case Plaintiff was injured by stepping into a hole 
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at the edge of the paved sidewalk. The hole was in the 
form of a triangle, the apex extending into the sidewalk 
seven to eight inches, and the length being about thirty-
three inches. The Plaintiff testified she did not see 
the hole in the sidewalk. In going from the store, she 
stepped off the edge at the broken place and was injured. 
It was a bright, clear, sunshiny day in April. The Court 
held Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law, saying: 
"If, as appears from another portion of the 
testimony on behalf of the Plaintiff, she walked 
in a Northwesterly direction to a point about 
opposite the middle of the west window of Town's 
Store, then this broken edge was plainly within 
the ordinary range of her view as she passed 
from the front door of the store to a point to the 
north edge of the sidewalk, and she must have· 
walked several feet from the point where she 
turned before she stepped off the sidewalk, dur-
ing which time the broken edge was in plain view 
and almost directly in front of her." 
The C.ourt cites and relies upon the case of Bender 
v. Town of Menden, 124 Iowa 685, 100 N.W. 352. In this 
case the Plaintiff stood near the hole in question, talking 
to a companion and ~then turned and fell into the hole. 
The Plaintiff contended his attention was dive:rted by his 
conversation with his companion. The Court said: 
"The range of vision is not so limited that 
one must look directly at a thlng in order to see 
it. Had Plaintiff used his senses either as he 
approached the opening, or while standing within 
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18 inch~s of it, he n1ust have seen it, the defect 
\Vas in plain sight, and n1ight have been seen by 
the Plaintiff had he been using his eyes." 
The Court further says: 
~'Counsel suggest that it was irnpossible for 
plaintiff to approach an opening in a sidewalk 
of the size of the one described without se·eing 
it, and that, if he did not see it, he was guilty of 
negligence in not doing so. This we think must be 
so." 
Jackson r. City of Jamestown, 33 N.D. 596, 157 N.W. 
475, Plaintiff was standing on the sidewalk joshing with 
a friend, when he stepped backwards off the sidewalk 
into a trench or ditch 1% feet de-ep and 1 foot 4 inches 
wide which was about 1 foot away from the sidewalk. 
In reversing a judgment for the Plaintiff and directing 
the trial court to enter a judgment for the Defendant, 
the Court says: 
" 'The law will not excuse a traveler in failing 
to make such use of his faculties as will enable 
him to discover plain and obvious dangers in the 
highway or sidewalk in front of him, but if he 
heedlessly casts himself upon a plain and obvious 
obstruction or into a plain and obvious e·xcavation, 
he and not the city must suffer the consequences 
of his negligence and folly.' Thompson on Negli-
gence, volume 5, section 6242. 'There is no rule 
of law that goes so far as to excuse the traveler 
from making such use of his faculties to discover 
dangers and protect himself from them as pru-
dent and careful travelers should make.. He can 
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not rely so far on the presumption that the muni-
cipal authorities have done their duty and have 
kept the highway in repair as to go blindly for-
wa:rd without looking ahead and to take chances 
of getting along safely. His failure ~to notice large 
holes in the~ highway ahead of him will be imputed 
to hirn as contributory negligence, unless his at-
tention has been distracted in some other direc-
tion, not idly, but by some sufficient cause.'" 
Watkins v. City of Raleigh, 214 N.C. 644, 200 S.E. 
424. The Plaintiff, on May 9, 1936, at about 10 :30 a.m., 
fell at a hole in the sidewalk approximately 2Yz feet wide, 
3 feet long, and 2 or more. inches deep. She testified she 
did not see the hole. The court quotes extensively from 
the testimony to show that the hole was plainly visible 
and says: 
"A person travelling on a street is required in 
the exercise of due care to use his faculties to dis-
cover and avoid dangerous defects and obstruc-
tions, the care required being commensurate 
with the danger or appearance thereof. He is 
guilty of contributory negligence if by reason of 
his failure to exercise such care he fails to dis-
cover and avoid a defect which is visible and ob-
vious." 
D'Annunzio v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Com-
pany, 143 Pa. Super 422, 18 A. 2d 86. The hole involved 
he·re was llf2 to 2 feet wide and 2Yz to 3 feet long, and 
from 2 to 4 inches deep. The Court says : 
"It is true that plaintiff, in describing rthe 
happening of the accident, testified that he looked. 
But it was not enough for plaintiff to say he was 
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looking and did not see the defect. Any exercise 
of reasonable diligence "\vould have disclosed the 
hole. He was bound to see what was plainly vis-
ible. In Graham v. Philadelphia, 19 Pa. Super. 
292, at page 295, this court said: 'We recognize the 
principle that it is in vain for one to say that he 
looked and did not see, when, if he had looked, he 
must have seen, and that in such a case it is not 
the duty of the Court to submit to the jury the 
question 'vhether he looked and failed to see the 
danger.' In the present case the hole in the side-
walk was plainly visible and if plaintiff had 
looked, he must have seen the danger. Dangers 
'vhich are apparent to ordinary observation must 
be avoided by those who ap·proach them." 
Goodman v. Theatre Parking, Inc., 281 N.W. 545, 286 
Mich. 80. Defendant maintained an auto parking lot. 
Plaintiff parked his car and stepped out to get money 
from his pocket. He stepped on a cinder and sprained 
his ankle. He was awarded judgment by the lower court. 
On appeal the case was reversed. The Court says.: 
"If rthe cinder was as large as claimed by 
Plaintiff, it was plainly discernible. Plaintiff 
claims that, as he stepped out, the running hoard 
of his car -vvould shut off the view of the cinder 
had he looked, but this did not relieve him of the 
duty of looking where he was about to step, and he 
testified he did not look. Ordinary prudence de-
mands that a view be taken of the place where one 
is about to step. Plaintiff failed to take such view 
and, even if defendant was negligent in permit-
ting the cinder to remain upon the lot, plaintiff's 
contributory negligence bars recovery." 
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POINT II. 
IT IS THE DUTY OF A PERSON USING A SIDEWALK, 
WHERE HE KNOWS A DEFECT EXISTS, TO BE ON THE 
LOOKOUT FOR IT. 
Plaintiff freely admitted that she knew of the exist-
ence of the defect complained of. She passed it two or 
three times a day for over a year. She was conscious 
that it presented a danger. Furthermore, she knew as she 
was walking along on the day of the accident that she 
was approaching the vicinity of this defect. She had it 
in mind and yet did not see it. Under such circumstances, 
we submit that it was her duty to keep a lookout for this 
defect, and her failure to do so precludes her from re-
covery. 
II Restatement of the Law of Torts, S.ection 474, 
page 1248: 
"Nevertheless the plaintiff must not only ex-
ercise reasonable care to avoid dangers which are 
obvious or of which he has knowledge, but he must 
be alert to discover the actual condition of the 
roadway. * * * Therefore, if the plaintiff would 
have obse.rved the dangerous condition in time tto 
avoid it, had he been paying that attention, which, 
in view of the normal risks of travel, a traveler 
should have paid, his contributory negligence in 
failing to exercise such reasonable vigilance· is 
a bar to his recovery." 
In 17 L.R.A., N.S. 198, is the following: 
"A traveler, having no notice of danger, need 
not keep a special lookout for defects or dangers, 
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but n1ay rely upon the presu1nption that the walk 
is safe, but, if he has notice of a defect, or has 
reason to believe that a defect exists in the side-
walk, it is his duty to be on the lookout for it, and 
use reasonable care, commensurate with the known 
danger, to avoid an accident therefrom." 
This same note further says: 
'"If a person knew of a defect in a sidewalk, 
and was injured thereby, it is presumed, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, that he re-
membered it and was negligent." 
Dunn v. Wagner, 22 Cal. App. 2d 51, 70 P. 2d 498. 
The defect here involved was a rise in a part of the. side-
walk above the other. Plaintiff testified she was per-
sonally familiar with the condition as she had lived in the 
neighborhood and had seen the rise on numerous occa-
sions before the accident. The Court held the evidence 
was insufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict 
for the plaintiff and reversed the judgment, saying: 
"Here the defect, if it Wfts a defect, was vis-
ible and had existed for a long period of time and 
Plaintiff herself knew of its existence, as above 
stated, and by the use of ordinary care could have 
avoided the accident. It is the duty of a pedestrian 
traveling in or crossing a public street of a city to 
use ordinary care for his personal safety and to 
reasonably exercise the facultjes with which he is 
endowed by nature for self protection, and if he 
fails to do so and is injured by reason of such fail-
ure, he has himself to blame and cannot recover on 
account of said injury. Weihe v. Rathjen Mer-
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chan tile Co., 34 Cal. Ap·p. 302, 167 P. 287; Kennedy 
v. Philadelphia, 220 Pa. 273, 69 A. 748, 17 L.R.A. 
( n. s.) 194 ; 13 Cal. J ur. 372, Sec. 60. Where he 
knows of 'the danger he must look out for it." 
Bodenheimer v. City of New Orleans, ______ La. ______ , 
18 So. 2d 224. Here the depression was 5 feet long, 2·¥2 
feet wide, and varying from 1 to 2112 inches in depth. 
The accident occurred at 9:30 a.m. The Plaintiff knew 
the sidewalk was out of repair. On the point here in-
volved the Court says: 
"In cases where the pedestrian concedes that 
he knew that the walk was in bad condition, the 
reason for the doctrine (presumption that side-
walk is safe) disappears. In such instances, the 
care required of him must be commensurate with 
his knowledge-and it seems manifest that he can-
not excuse his failure to avoid an open danger by 
asserting that he was entitled to assume that the 
path was safe· for travel. * * * Her prior knowledge 
should have placed her on her guard. By the ex-
ercise of reasonable care, she 'Could have easily 
averted the unfortunate accident." 
Matthews v. City of LeGrand, 136 Ore. 426, 2.99 P. 
999. The court approved the following instruction: 
"Where such pedestrian knows, or by tthe 
exercise of ordinary care ought to know, that a 
sidewalk is in a dangerous condition, such pedes-
trian cannot assume that such way is safe, and 
must exercise greater caution in passing over such 
way." 
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O'Neill v. City of St. Louis, 292 Mo. 656, 239 S.W. 
94. The Court says : 
''Here she knew of the defect and frankly 
says that she could have seen it that night had she 
been on the lookout. She admits knowledge, and 
admits that if at the time of the injury she had 
been looking, she could have seen and avoided the 
dangerous place which was the occasion of her 
injury. In such a case, ordinary care would have 
required her to have been upon a lookout for the 
dangerous place of which she had knowledge. Her 
admitted failure constitutes contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law." 
Rinfret v. Clegg, 58 R. I. 478, 193 A. 620. HeTe the 
hole was about 3 feet long, 3 feet wide, and 4 to 5 inches 
deep. Plaintiff was familiar with its e·xistence. The 
Court says: 
"In these circumstances, the necessary and 
sole inference to be drawn from rthe evidence is 
that she stumbled and fell because she was not 
looking for the hole as she was bound to do if it 
was dangerous and she knew of the danger." 
POINT III. 
A PERSON, WHO, IN BROAD DAYLIGHT, STEPS INTO 
AN OPEN, PLAINLY VISIBLE DEFECT IN THE SIDE-
WALK, WITH WHICH HE IS FAMILIAR, IS GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
It is clear from the evidence that Plaintiff in broad 
daylight stepp·ed into a depression which was open and 
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plainly visible and with which she was thoroughly fami-
liar. Under the following authorities she is guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
Roth v. Vernona Borough, 316 Pa. 279, 175 A. 689. 
The Court says : 
"The accident occurred at high noon of a 
bright, clear .summer day. Plaintiff testified that 
she 'knew the sidewalk was rough and uneven, it 
really wasn't fit to walk on.' She also testified 
she saw the hole that day 'when it was about 
twelve feet away.' It was intimated that the hole 
might have been concealed from her view by chil-
dren running around on the pavement, and by a 
man who was walking towards her. But she walked 
the twelve feet between it and her when she first 
saw it, before she and the man met face to face aJt 
one side of the hole, and then she stepped sideways 
directly into it. The man could not, therefore, at 
any time, have interfered with her vision, so far as 
t.he hole was concerned; and she was too close to 
the hole when she stepped into it for either him 
or the children to have interfered with her seeing 
it at that time·. It is e:vident she was then giving 
no heed to her own safety. When she stepped to 
one side and into the hole, she either saw it or she 
did not. If she looked she muS't have then seen 
it and delliherately or negligently stepped into it, 
for she says it was oblong in shape; its longest 
diameter eight and three-quarters inches, and its 
depth one and a half inches. If she did not look, 
then she negleeted her duty in traversing this 
pavement, which she knew 'really wasn't fit to 
walk on.' In either event she cannot recover." 
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Blankenship v. Kansas City, 156· Kan. 607, 135 P. 
2d 588. The Court says: 
"Here the t-estimony showed plaintiff was 
aware of the claimed defect and had avoided use 
of the particular crossing because she knew it was 
dangerous, yet notwithstanding she proceeded at 
her usual gait and usual walk to go straight across 
the crossing. It would seem that with full knowl-
edge of the situation and the claimed dangerous 
condition with which she was fully familiar, she 
not only did not affirmatively act with the care an 
ordinary prudent person would have exercised in 
the circumstances, but she proceeded in utter dis-
regard as to possible consequences." 
Burns v. Mayor of Baltimore, 138 Md. 582, 115 A. 
111. The hole involved here was caused by a number of 
displaced bricks in the sidewalk. The evidence showed 
the plaintiff had seen this hole frequently and knew of 
its existence. The Court directed a verdict for the city 
because of plaintiff's contributory negligence. This was 
affirmed by the appellate court which said : 
"In view of the majority of the court, the 
long-continued defect in the sidewalk and the full 
knowledge of the plaintiff of the condition, and 
with nothing to qualify in this regard the testi-
mony of the plaintiff, there was nothing left for 
the jury to find upon this point, and the court up-
on the subject of contributory negligence was cor-
rect, and the judgment appealed from must be 
affirmed." 
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Ryan v. Foster, 137 Iowa 737, 115 N.W. 595. Plain-
tiff stumbled over a billboard which had fallen on the 
sidewalk in the process of being taken down. The Court 
says: 
"We think the record conclusively establishes 
plaintiff's contributory negligence. The section of 
the billlboard was in plain sight. There was a 
4 x 4 nailed to the boards extending up on the 
sidewalk. It had been snowing, and the ground 
was white. The billboard had no snow upon it and 
was plainly visible. Indeed, the most casual glance 
would disclose its presence and location. Plain-
tiff's attention was in no manner diverted and, had 
she used her eyes, she could not have failed to see 
it. She eithe-r did see it, or was negligent in not 
seeing it. If she saw it, and attempted to pass over 
it, she was negligent; and if she did not see it, as 
she says, then she was clearly negligent." 
King v. Colon Tp. 125 Mich. 511, 84 N.W. 1077. The 
Court says: 
"It would be a dangerous doctrine that one 
injured on the public highway in broad daylight 
may excuse himself by saying: 'It is true that I 
knew of the dangerous place ; that I was in close 
proximity to it; that I might have seen it had I 
looked. But I did not think of it, and therefore did 
not look.' I find no case that lays down such a rule 
of law." 
POINT IV. 
TO EXCUSE FAILURE TO SEE AN OPEN, PLAINLY 
VISIBLE KNOWN DEFECT, THE PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW 
SOME COMPELLING REASON OUTSIDE HERSELF THAT 
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WOULD JUSTIFY HER F AlLURE TO SEE THE DEFECT 
IN ORDER TO FREE HER FROM CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE. 
It should be re1nembered that Plaintiff had reached 
the defect of which she complains before her attention 
was in any manner attracted to the children approach-
ing. She testified that she had reached either the South-
east corner of the open space or a point opposite the 
place where she fell, whichever version of her testimony 
referred to in the Statement of Facts is adopted, before 
she saw the children. The sidewalk before her was en-
tirely unobstructed and open. There was nothing rto pre-
vent her from seeing the open space as she approached 
it. There is no testimony as to any conduct on the part 
of the children that would create any emotion in the 
Plaintiff that would distract her attention. All that ap·-
pears is that the children were coming toward her, which 
is a common everyday experience which anyone using 
a public sidewalk would encounter. If she had been keep-
ing any kind of a reasonable lookout, she would have seen 
the open space as she approached it and as she reached it, 
and up to that time there wasn't a thing to distracrt her 
attention as she had not then seen the children. The 
paved sidewalk on which she was walking was eight feet 
wide, which would furnish ample room for ordinary pas-
sage. There is nothing to show that the children occupied 
the whole of this eight-foot walk or that it was necessary 
for the Plaintiff to step to one side. She does not testify 
as to what rthe children were doing or that she sensed 
any danger in their approach, or anything about the 
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children that would cause her to divert her attention 
from the sidewalk to them. We submit that the Plaintiff 
has not shown such a compelling reason outside of her-
self that would excuse her from seeing what was obvious 
and open for her to see and to justify her failure to see 
where she was stepping. 
Lerner v. ~hiladelphia, 221 Pa. 294, 70 A. 755, 21 
L.R.A., N.S. 614; the accident here occurred at 4 :00 
o'clock p.m. in April. The defect consisted of the dis-
placement of some bricks in the sidewalk causing a de-
pression into which plaintiff stepped and fell. The Court 
held the plaintiff was not entitled to recovery, saying: 
"When the· accident occurs in broad daylight, 
in consequence of an open and exposed defect in 
the sidewalk, the burden res'ts upon the party com-
plaining to show conditions outside of himself 
which prevented him seeing the defect, or which 
would excuse his failure to observe it. If such 
conditions exist, there is excuse for walking by 
faith. When they do not e:xist, the law charges 
the· party with failure to do what was re:quired 
of him.'' 
Bodenheimer v. City of New Orleans, 18 S. 2d 224. 
We have already cited this case in our brief. The plain-
tiff kne\v the sidewalk was out of repair. She saw a lady 
across the street with a small dog. Being interested in 
the dog, she crossed over and stood talking to the owner. 
When she turned rto leave, she stepped into the depres-
sion. The Court held she was not entitled to recover, 
saYing: 
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"'The defect, as we have said, was perfectly 
obvious, and a casual glance by J\1rs. Bodenheimer 
"~ould haYe immediately advised her of the dan-
gerous place at ":hich she was standing. But her 
attention "~as so completely diverted by her in-
terest in the pet dog of Mrs. Martinez that she 
apparently forgot all about the danger. It is true 
that she explains in her testilnony that she did 
not know the existence of the particular defect 
which caused her injury, but that she, in common 
'vith other residents of the neighborhood, was 
cognizant that the general condition of the side-
walk was bad. However, the fact that she did not 
know of the particular defect should have 
prompted her to exert greate-r caution as she was 
well aware of the general unsound condition of 
the walk." 
Grubman v. City of New York, 25 NYS 2d 757. Here 
the Plaintiff claims the heel of her shoe was caught in a 
broken sidewalk, of which she knew, after she stepped 
back a couple of steps on seeing a dog approaching her 
dog. The accident happened at 10:00 a.m. July 14, 1940. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint was granted. 
The Court says: 
"Briefly, the court finds that the time of the 
accident was 10:00 o'clock in the morning in broad 
daylight; the piaintiff resided in the neighborhood 
for 20 years; she knew of the particular defective 
condition; she took several steps backwards which 
caused her heel to catch in the broken sidewalk, 
throwing her to the ground. It is apparent that 
plaintiff's own want of caution and ordinary care 
contributed in part to the accident and prevents 
her recovery." 
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Roth v. V ernona Burrough, 316 Pa. 279, 175 A. 689. 
We have already quoted from this case under Point III. 
Upon the point here involved, we desire to call the Court's 
attention to the fact that there were children running 
around on the pavement and a man was approaching the 
plaintiff and met her face to face at one side of the hole. 
The Court points out that neither the _man nor the chil-
dren interfered with her seeing the hole as she. got close 
to it and stepped into it. This case presents identically 
the same facts as the instant case and holds that plain-
tiff's negligence prevented her from recovery. 
Devine v. Sampler Bros. Co., 362 Pa. 164, 66 A. 2d 
779. Plaintiff was walking with her daughter and grand-
son on an avenue on August 21, 1.946 at 2 :00 p.m. The 
defendant was making repairs and excavating part of 
the sidewalk in front of its premises near the curb. As 
plaintiff approached the intersection the stree~t was 
crowded with people. Several buses were loading and 
discharging passengers. Plaintiff stepped to the right 
to avoid them, was caught in part of the excavation on 
the sidewalk, and throiWll to the ground, suffering injury. 
The Defendant contended that the. plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law in stepping 
into an unguarded despression which was plainly visible. 
The trial court accepted this view, saying: 
"It was ~the obligation of the plaintiff who 
stepped into a depression in the sidewalk in full 
daylight to produce evidence showing that she was 
prevented from seeing danger or excusing her 
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failure to observe it. It is the duty of a pedestrian 
to look as she or he walks and to see that which 
is to be seen and if one looks." 
The appellate court affirms the language above 
quoted and cites and relies upon Lerner v. City of Phila-
delphia, supra. 
White v. City of Harrisburg, 20 A. 2d 751. Plaintiff 
was crossing Pine Street. A three-foot strip of macadam 
had been placed over the wood block bed of the street 
parallel to the curb and was 31f2 inches higher than the 
bed. Plaintiff stumbled over this rise and sought to ex-
cuse failure to see it by saying: "I was not looking down 
at all. I was watching the traffic." The Court held she 
was guilty of contributory negligence and could not re-
cover. 
Foster v. Burrough of Westview, 195 A. 82 328 Pa. 
368. Here plaintiff and her companion were walking on 
the sidewalk. As they approached close to the private 
entrance walk to 444 Perrysville Avenue a child ap-
proached the sidewalk from the house. As plaintiff and 
her companion were occupying the full width of the con-
crete sidewalk, plaintiff, in order to make room for the 
child, stepped from the paved to the unpaved portion 
between the p·aved walk and rthe curb and fell. There 
was an inequality of several inches between the concrete 
walk and the unpaved ground. Plaintiff was familiar 
with the condition. The Court held that the unpaved 
strip of land was clearly visible and that she could nort 
recover. 
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City of Birmingham v. Edwards, 201 Ala. 251, 77 
So. 841. The Court says: 
"If plaintiff knew of the defect in the side-
walk, then conrt.ributory negligence on her part in 
not remembering and avoiding the danger is to be 
presumed in the absence of satisfactory excuse 
for forgetting. This rule merely places upon the 
pedestrian, after it appears that he well knew of 
the defective condition of the sidewalk, and its 
attending danger, the burden of offering testi-
mony to excuse his forgetfulness or inattention." 
Reynolds v. Los Angeles Gas & E. Company, 162 Cal. 
327, 122 P. 962. The Court held the plaintiff was barred 
from recovering as a matter of law by her contributory 
negligence, saying: 
"That momentary forgetfulness of a depres-
sion, which forgetfulness is not induced by some 
sudden and adequate disturbing cause, is itself 
as a matter of law contributory negligence barring 
recovery." 
Davis v. Cal. Stree.t Cable Railroad Company, 105 
Cal. 131, 38 P. 647. Defendant had placed an iron rail 
to be used in the construction of its street railway track 
in front of the home in which Plaintiff lived. It had re-
mained there for about four weeks. A fire alarm sounded 
in the night, and plaintiff came out of her house and 
started across the sidewalk to discover the whereabouts 
of the fire. S·he forgot the presence of the rail, tripped, 
fell, and was injured. The Court held that plaintiff would 
have been excused from remembering the rail if her house 
had been falling and goes on to say: 
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"But that is not this case. No danger could 
have been apprehended by Mrs. Davis from the 
fire after she reached the sidewalk, but mere 
curiosity induced her to start to go down the street 
to see where the fire was. That she forgot the 
presence of the rail is not disputed in the evi-
dence, but that the circumstances justified her 
forgetfulness and consequent want of care cannot 
be conceded." 
She was held to be guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. 
Hill v. Richmond, 189 Va. 576, 53 S.E. 2d 810. Plain-
tiff fell by slipping on a depression in the sidewalk four 
inches deep in the center and sloping gradually from the 
circumference with a diameter of 4% feet. It was snow-
ing and the depression was somewhat obscured by the 
snow. Plaintiff had lived in the vicinity eight years, knew 
of the depression, walked by it many times. The court 
held she was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law. 
City of Winchester v. Carroll, 99 Va. 727, 40 S.E. 
37. Here the sidewalk was three feet higher than the 
surface of the street with no barriers or guard rails. 
Plaintiff had passed by it and over it frequently. On the 
night in question, she walked up the steps at the end of 
the sidewalk to go to commencement exercises. When she 
came out the sidewalk was crowded and, forgetting the 
difference in elevation, she stepped from it into the street 
and was injured. The court held she was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. 
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Hupfe,r v. City of North Platte, 134 Neb. 585, 279 
N.W. 68. Plaintiff, in broad daylight, was walking along 
the sidewalk, watching a parade. She stepped into a de--
pression in the sidewalk two to five inches deep and fell. 
The Court held the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. 
Fleming v. City of Rockford, 303 Ill. App. 224, 25 
N.E. 2d 128. The decision is contained in the headnote 
which reads as follows: 
"A pedestrian who could have seen hole in 
sidewalk and could have avoided it if she had 
looked, but who heedlessly proceeded along side-
walk without looking, proximately contributed to 
her own injury, and could not recover therefor 
from city notwithstanding that her thoughts im-
mediately prior to fall were for safety of baby 
which her daughter was pushing at her side in 
baby cab and toward which an automobile was 
being pushed." 
Rinfret v. Clegg, 58 R. I. 478, 193 A. 620. The plain-
tiff was waJlking with her sister on one side and a gentle-
man friend on the other, intending to go to the beach 
to join in a celebration the night before the 4th of July. 
The street was more or less crowded and a spirit of festi-
vity prevailed. Plaintiff testified that she was talking 
with her companions when she suddenly fell on her face .. 
There was a hole in the sidewalk three feet long, three 
feet wide, and four or five inches deep. She was familiar 
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with this defect and had walked around it on other occa-
sions. The Court held she was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, saying: 
''A person using a sidewalk which he knows 
is in a defective condition, who is not confronted 
with any sudden occurrence or emergency, is 
bound to exercise that degree of watchfulness 
and caution that a person of ordinary prudence 
would exercise under like circumstances. 
"There is no evidence in the instant case that, 
at the time of the accident, the plaintiff's attention 
was diverted by any sudden occurrence, or that 
there was any emergency which made it ne.cessary 
for her to walk over a dangerous p'lace in the 
sidewalk that she had avoided for some twenty-
one or twenty-two years and had never 'stepped 
on it before that night.'" 
D'Annunzio v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Com-
pany, 143 Pa. Super. 422, 18 A. 2d 86. We have hereto-
fore cited this case under Point II. We quote in addition 
the following: 
"When, in broad daylight, one walks into an 
obvious and exposed defect in a sidewalk, a pre-
sumption of contributory negligence arises, and 
the plaintiff is obliged to show conditions outside 
himself which prevented him from seeing the de-
fect, or which would excuse his failure to notice 
it. Bean v. City of Philadelphia, 260 Pa. 278, 280, 
103 A. 727; Klein v. City of Pittsburgh, 97 Pa. 
Super. 56, 61; Walker v. Stern, 132 Pa. Super 
343, 346, 200 A. 897. In the present case the hole 
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in the sidewalk was plainly visibie, and if plain-
tiff had looked he must have seen the danger. 
Dangers which are apparent to ordinary observa-
tion must be avoided by those who approach them. 
'The law exacts reasonable care of those who use 
public footways and if the user fails to notice an 
obvious danger he is negligent as a matter of 
law.'" 
PLAINTIFF'S AUTHORITIES DO NOT 
WARRANT A REVERSAL 
We have read all the cases cited by Plaintiff in her 
brief. We respectfully submit that they do not entitle 
her to a reversal in this case. We shall state our reasons 
for this assertion. 
Sm.ith v. City of Tacoma, 163 Wash. 626, 1 P. 2d 
870. In this case the boards of a wooden walk had buckled 
in several places, causing raises in the boards. Plaintiff 
thought she had passed all the raises. It appears, there-
fore, that she was apparently watchful for the defects 
and assumed that she was beyond them. Such a state of 
facts is entirely different from the instant case. The 
Court makes the significant statement, also, that the 
cases cited by the City sustain its position for non-suit 
on the ground of contributory negligence, but the Court 
refused to follow them. 
Denton v. City of Twin Falls, 54 Idaho 35, 28 P. 2d 
202. Here plaintiff testified his attention was distracted 
by a boy who "yelled out and it kind of startled me and 
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I looked around to see what 'vas going on, and the next 
thing I knew I 'Yas getting up. Just when he let out his 
yell, then is when I fell." There is no such sudden or 
disturbing element in the instant case. 
Cox 'V. City of Coffeyville, 153 Kan. 392, 110 P. 2d 
77'2. In this case Moore, carrying groceries, came upon 
the plaintiff suddenly from around the corner of a build-
Ing. The Court says: 
"The meeting with Moore was so sudden 
plaintiff could not allege whether Moore actually 
brushed plaintiff and pushed him into the hole, or 
whether plaintiff stepped aside to avoid a colli-
sion and fell into the hole." 
There is no such sudden emergency involved in the in-
stant case. 
The cases cited from 13 A.L.R. 87 all involved icy 
condition of the sidewalk. In the New York case the 
place seemed dangerous a few days before, and, at the 
time of his fall, plaintiff's attention was diverted by a 
crowd. Where the defective condition was due to ice, it 
is clear that the condition would change from day to day. 
In the Missouri case the plaintiff slipped as he stepped 
aside to let a person pass, which might happen if the 
plaintiff were ever so careful and was conscious of the 
slippery condition. In the Wisconsin case the snow con-
cealed the outline of the hummock of ice so that plaintiff 
did not see it, when he was accosted by a friend while 
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walking along in a snow storm. The note also cites 
Chicago v. McDonald, 111 rn. App. 436, where a woman 
who was passing along the street and noticed an attrac-
tion in the window of a dry goods store turned to go to 
the store and did not see a strip of ice over which she 
crossed, and fell upon it and was injured. It was held 
she was guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar 
her recovery. 
Mullins v. City of Butte, 93 Mont. 601, 20 P. 2d 626. 
There was no evidence in this case that the defect, a loose 
block, was yisible. Plaintiff thought she heard her five-
year old son crying as she neared her home and started 
rto run to get to it. There was no such distracting element 
in the instant case. The Court held that the mere knowl-
edge of the defect alone wa.s not sufficient. 
In Hughey v. Fergus County, 98 Mont. 98, 37 P. 2d, 
1035, the Court states the rule to be that mere knowledge 
of the· existence of the offending instrumentality where 
the injury is suffered does not raise the legal presump-
tion of negligence unless "it further appears that plain-
tiff had .reason to apprehend danger." The Court says: 
"This court has declared that 'every person is 
bound to an absolute duty to exercise his intelli-
gence to discover and avoid dangers that may 
threaten him. When, therefore, a plaintiff asserts 
the right of recovery on the ground of culpable 
negligence of the defendant, he is bound to show 
rthat he exercised his intelligence to discover and 
avoid the danger, which he alleges wa.s brought 
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about by the negligence of the defendant' ( Sherris 
v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 55 Mont. 189, 175 P. 
269, 271), and 'when the circumstances attending 
the injury, as detailed by the plaintiff's evidence, 
raise a presumption that he was not, at the time, 
in the exercise of due care, he has failed to make 
out a case for the jury. The burden is then upon 
him, and if he fails to introduce other evidence 
to remove this presumtion, he is properly non-
suited.' (George v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 59 
Mont. 162, 196 P. 869, 870.)" 
In the instant case Plaintiff was well aware not only of 
the existence of the depression, but that it was dangerous. 
Barry v. Terkildsen, 72 Cal. 254, 13 P. 657. In this 
case the plaintiff "never knew before that the hole was 
there." So she had a right to assume the sidewalk was in 
safe condition and was not negligent in being momen-
tarily attracted to some children playing on the street. 
No such assumption is available to a plaintiff who knows 
that the sidewalk is out of repair and dangerous. 
Van Praag v. Gale, 107 Cal. 438, 40 P. 5·55. Here the 
defendant had a basement well in the sidewalk which 
gave access to the basement. Plaintiff, who had a store 
next door, went past the well which then was covered 
and talked to a jeweler three to five minutes. While plain-
tiff was talking to the jeweler, the ashman came and 
opened the trap door, but plaintiff did not know the door 
was open. When he returned, he was looking at some 
figures he had received from the jeweler and feU into 
the opening. 
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DuVal v. Boos Bros. Cafete.ria Co., 45 Cal. App. 377, 
187 P. 767. Plaintiff was injured when she fell into a 
sidewalk well leading into the defendant's basement. 
When ten or twelve feet from the trap doors, she saw 
they were closed. Her attention was attracted to some-
tiring she was passing. She turned her head and as she 
walked that short distance, one of the doors was raised 
directly in her pathway and she fell. 
We submit that neither of these two California 
cases are in anywise in point to sustain plaintiff's posi-
tion here. 
Wolverton v. Village of Saranac, 171 Mich. 419, 137 
N.W. 211. Here there were ten holes of varying sizes with 
which plaintiff was more or less familiar. When she ap-
proached them, she slackened her pace and passed over 
several safely. While attempting to avoid one of the 
larger holes, she stepped into one of the smaller ones 
and either slipped or stumbled. It appears, therefore, 
that plaintiff was consciously trying to avoid the defects, 
and under such circumstances it woruld be a question for 
the jury to determine whether she was quiity of contribu-
tory negligence. Such a case is entirely different from the 
instant case where plaintiff did not see the defect and 
was not attempting to avoid it. 
Carton v. City of Philadelphia, 142 Pa. Super. 381, 
22 A. 2d 603. Here the· plaintiff was walking beside her 
daughter who was pushing a baby carriage. Steps can1e 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
out fron1 a building and narro,ved the sidewalk, so plain-
tiff stepped behind her daughter until they had passed 
the steps. Then she stepped forward to get alongside her 
daughter. ..A.s she did so, she stepped into a hole in the 
sidewalk. The carriage had passed over the hole, and 
this, together 'vi th the position of ~the parties, prevented 
plaintiff from seeing the defect, which was three inches 
'vide, five inches long and three inches deep. There is no 
evidence that she knew of this defect nor any special 
reason for her to anticipate a danger of the character 
encountered. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit there is no other conclusion possible in 
this case than that the negligent inattention of the Plain-
tiff, herself, contributed to the happening of the un-
fortunate occurrence. By law she was bound, not only 
to keep a reasonable lookout as she proceeded along the 
walk, as are all pedestrians, and thus avoid obvious and 
patent defects, but, since she knew of the defect and 
was conscious of its presence and its danger, she was 
held to a higher degree of care. She was required to 
keep a lookout for the defect. This she did not do. 
Furthermore, the defect being of the size it was, perfectly 
visible and such that one who looked ahead with seeing 
eyes couid nort help but see, it being broad daylight, and 
nothing to obstruct her view, we submit that her failure 
to see the defect and act accordingly can only be ascribed 
to her inatten'tion and lack of reasonable care. 
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The meeting of people on the sidewalk is an every-
day occurrence. There is nothing in the evidence that 
would warrant any inference that Plaintiff's meeting the 
children was any different than ordinarily occurs. While 
she states there were fifty or sixty, they were strung 
out, and there is no evidence as to the number in the 
vanguard approaching the Plain'tiff or what they were 
doing, or how much of the paved walk they occupied. 
Nor is there any evidence to shorw there was any need 
for Plaintiff to step aside nor any excuse for he·r failure 
to look as she so stepped, knowing as she did that she 
was in the vicinity of this defect and that the same ap-. 
peared dangerous to he·r. 
There is no dispute as to the facts. The question of 
her contributory negligence appears as a matter of iaw. 
It was the trial court's clear duty to grant the dismissal, 
and that judgment of dismissal should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRIS.TENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assistant City Attorneys 
Attorneys for Respondent 
SALT LAKE CITY 
414 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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